The Corrosive Effect of Alternatives on Ranking Claims
Abstract
Consumers frequently browse ranking information to aid in their choices. This research investigates how consumers evaluate a target option as a function of two parameters of ranking information: the precision of the target option's rank and the salience of alternatives. We theorize that the salience of alternatives may exert a disproportionate impact on evaluations about the target. Eight pre-registered experiments demonstrate that consumers like a target option less when that target is ranked near the bottom of a limited list featuring precise rankings (e.g., #10 in the top 10) compared to when it is a member of an expanded list that lacks precise ranking information (e.g., among the top 50). We obtain our results even though consumers presented with imprecise rankings believe that the target is ranked lower than do those who are provided with precise rankings. We show that this effect occurs because typical imprecise ranking claims obfuscate alternatives while typical precise rankings highlight them. In turn, the salience of alternative options dilutes evaluations of the target. We discuss important theoretical and managerial implications, and demonstrate that consumers and industry professionals do not predict this bias.
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