Concealing Prices

Seminars - Brown Bag Series
Speakers
DIEGO APARICIO, IESE Business School
1:00pm - 2:30pm
Seminar Room 4-E4-SR03, 4th floor, via Roentgen 1
Wohlfart

Abstract

A popular tactic in retail is to delay the presentation of a product’s price. This practice has stood the test of time: window displays invite shoppers to “ask inside for prices,” catalogs urge readers to “contact us for prices,” and recently online stores ask shoppers to “click to reveal prices” or “add to cart to see price.” This work reports a novel empirical test of this question long debated by business people across industries: Is it better to show my prices upfront or later in a purchase process? Specifically, the paper reports several experiments in which prices were communicated to shoppers alongside the corresponding product or with a delay. These experiments show that delayed price disclosure can increase or decrease sales relative to immediate price disclosure. Importantly, these effects occur because delayed price disclosure influences the perception of high or low prices. Collectively, these findings extend research on price obfuscation and the role of friction in the shopping funnel.

 

Please contact dip.mkt@unibocconi.it if you wish to attend.